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Abstract
In this paper we look at the role of pre-payment (in the context of
pre-payment metering) for household electricity consumption. Using a
matching approach, we nd that households paying their electricity up-
front tend to consume more electricity than households paying ex post.
This is despite receiving information feedback on their electricity use and
facing higher transaction costs.
In the second part of the paper, we explore to what extent this nding
can be linked to an increase in payment exibility under a pre-payment
regime. Using data from the main electricity supplier in Northern Ireland
(NIE Energy), we explore how people top-up their pre-payment meters
and whether there is a link between peoples top-up behaviour and their
electricity consumption.
1 Introduction
With improvements in technology and falling operating costs pre-payment elec-
tricity metering is experiencing a revival all across Europe. A particularly im-
pressive example is the case of Northern Ireland: To date more than 240,000
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Grant, Hamish Low, Bhanu Patruni, Michael Pollitt and an anonymous reviewer for com-
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households in Northern Ireland (ca 30%) use pre-payment metering to pay for
their electricity.
Despite the wide-spread uptake, little is known about the role of pre-payment
for household energy consumption. This lack of research is surprising: Clearly,
household energy consumption is high up on the policy agenda as reected in a
series of high-level policy reports including the NAOs Programmes to Reduce
Household Energy Consumption and the Carbon Trusts report Climate Change:
a Business Revolution.
In addition, a large body of literature suggests that payment mattersfor
consumer behaviour: Peoples consumption behaviour has been shown to depend
on the payment method (Hirschman, 1979; Prelec and Simester, 1998); the time
between payments (Gourville and Soman, 1998); the way payments are framed
(Gourville, 1998); and the extent to which payments are "bundled (Morwitz
et al, 1998; Chetty et al, 2010).
In this paper we make a rst step towards better understanding the role of
payment in the context of pre-payment electricity metering. Using data from
the Northern Ireland Continuous Household Survey; from the main electricity
provider in Northern Ireland (NIE Energy); and the Northern Ireland Neigh-
bourhood Information Service, we focus on three questions:
1. What is the e¤ect of pre-payment on household energy consumption com-
pared to post consumption payment?
2. How do consumers use their pre-payment meters  e.g. what payment
schedules do they choose? and
3. What is the relationship between how consumers use their meters and
their energy consumption  e.g. does purchasing smaller top-ups more
often make people consume more energy?
The paper is organised as follows: In the rst part, we briey describe the
pre-payment situation in Northern Ireland. In the second part, we evaluate the
e¤ect of pre-payment on electricity consumption (relative to post-consumption
payment). The third part looks at peoples payment schedule under a pre-
payment system highlighting two behavioural anomalies. In the fourth part,
we explore the link between householdselectricity use and their payment sched-
ules. We conclude the paper with a discussion of some preliminary policy im-
plications arising from our research.
2
2 Pre-payment metering in Northern Ireland
We start our discussion with some background information on pre-payment
metering in Northern Ireland.
2.1 Background
Today customers can devise to pay their electricity bills in a number of ways.
They can pay cash or by cheque, use direct debit, or paperless online billing
(where customers take their own meter readings and enter them online). An-
other way of paying for electricity, which is gaining increasing popularity, is by
means of pre-payment metering.
The general idea of pre-payment metering is that electricity can only be
consumed if ones meter is in credit. When credit runs out, electricity sup-
ply is stopped. While traditionally pre-payment meters were used primarily in
tenements buildings and individually rented rooms, today they are used across
all socio-economic groups: To date, about 30% of all electricity customers in
Northern Ireland use pre-payment metering with new connections continuing
at a rate of 2,000 per month.
Figure 1: Keypad Customers by ACORN group
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of pre-payment customers in Northern Ire-
land by ACORN group. ACORN groups are dened on the basis of several
socio-economic variables.1 For simplicity, we focus here on income. The gure
shows that while half of all pre-payment customers fall into the ACORN group
hard pressedwith an average family income of 60% of the UK mean 35% fall
into the highest ACORN groups comfortably well-o¤(101% of mean income),
urban prosperity (129% of mean income), and wealthy achievers (137% of
mean income).
2.2 Main Features of the Keypad meters
The widespread uptake of pre-payment metering in Northern Ireland is closely
linked to a change in technology: Being dissatised with the old system, in 2002,
NIE Energy switched from a smart card system to a keypad metering system.
Only after this change in technology, pre-payment metering became broadly
used.2
The keypad system works in a similar way to a mobile phone top-up system.
At the vending outlet customers purchase a 16-digit code which they enter into
the keypad of their meter to receive credit. Other codes can be issued/used to
recalibrate the meter or to change the settings of the meter.3 From a customers
perspective, the main attraction of the new keypad system is that keypad meters
come with a discount compared to standard credit of 2.5% - which compares to
a discount of 4% for direct debit customers.
In addition, the keypad meter has a conveniently placed display which en-
ables customers to monitor consumption, credit available etc. It is also felt that
the range of credit top-up facilities4 customers can purchase their top-up in
shops (Payzone; Paypoint); post o¢ ces; via the phone; or using the internet
 have attracted a broader range of users and helped remove the stigma of
pre-payment.5
1ACORN is a geo-demographic information system categorising all United Kingdom post-
codes into various types based upon census data and other information such as lifestyle surveys.
2See Zhang (2010) for a detailed discussion of the di¤usion process.
3There is no two-way communication which is why the meter is typically referred to as
semi-smart.
4The majority of top-ups are (still) purchased at Paypoints and Payzone outlets. However,
this picture varies for di¤erent top-up amounts with relatively more customers using phone or
internet top-ups at higher top-up amounts. In addition, internet and phone top-ups increased
by 37% in 2009 compeared to 2008.
5A further attraction of the new pre-payment system is that it comes with friendly credit.
This means: users cannot self-disconnect at weekends or between 4pm and 8am (which can be
extended to 11am on request). This safeguard was requested by Ofreg, the Northern Ireland
4
The main advantage of the new system for NIE Energy is that keypad me-
ters come with reduced management costs: they do not require manned meter
readings, disconnections, or re-connections. Call outs occur only during working
hours and the danger of inaccurate meter readings is essentially eliminated. In
addition, there is no need to issue bills and the handling of debts becomes much
easier: Every time a customer in debt buys credit, a xed fraction of his/her
top-up can be marked towards redemption of old debts.
2.3 Pre-payment customers in Northern Ireland
In the last section, we noted the uptake of keypad meters across all socio-
economic groups. For what follows, it is important to bear in mind, however,
that despite the wide-spread acceptance of the new technology, pre-payment
customers are not a representative sample of the population.
The 2008/2009 Northern Ireland Continuous Household Survey asked 2,632
households about their electricity consumption and how they pay for it. This is
in addition to a large number of questions about their background characteristics
and other consumption behaviour. This information allows us to draw out some
of the di¤erences between keypad customers and customers using other forms
of payment for their electricity.
Table 1 and 2 provide summary statistics of the data. Table 1 shows the
distribution of electricity customers in Northern Ireland by payment type. Key-
pad customers fall into the group Slot-meter, Power Card & Pay-As-You-Go.
Because NIE Energy was the only electricity supplier in the residential sector
at the time, and because it provides only one type of pre-payment meter (its
keypad meter), this group comprises keypad customers only.
regulator, due to concerns from consumer groups and others about self-disconnection. Clearly,
electricity used during periods of friendly credit has to be repaid at the next top-up (Owen
and Ward, 2010).
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Number of Observations
Account 483
Monthly Instalments 594
Budget Account 62
Slot, Power Card and
Pay-As-You-Go 746
DHSS Direct Payment 33
Cash/Check with bill 691
Total 2,609
Table 1: Distribution of electricity customers in NI
The table shows: customers paying their electricity bill in cash or by check
and cutomers paying by means of pre-payment make up the largest portion
of customers which is consistent with the situation for the whole of North-
ern Ireland. Table 2 below shows the mean values of a series of background
characteristics for the entire sample.
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All households
Age of HH head 42.08
(16.35)
Female HH head 0.47
(0.50)
HH head eco. inactive 0.40
(0.49)
HH income (£ 1,000) 14,969
(15,866)
Number of adults 1.90
(1.00)
Number of children 0.67
(1.01)
Detached 0.12
(0.33)
Number of rooms 4.97
(1.16)
Old building 0.04
(0.20)
Renting 0.61
(0.49)
Electric Heating 0.26
(0.44)
Table 2: Background variables Keypad Cusomters and Others
In Table 3, we report the results from a logistic analysis on the association
between household background characteristics and the use of a keypad meter.
Economic theory provides little guidance on the specication of the model, so
variables were chosen on an ad hoc basis. The left hand column of Table 3
provides the estimated coe¢ cients; the right hand column shows the marginal
e¤ect of each variable on the probability of having a keypad meter calculated
at the mean of the explanatory variable.
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Coe¢ cient Marginal E¤ect
Age of HH head 0.05*** 0.008***
(0.02) 0.003
Age of HH head squared -0.0009*** -0.0001***
(0.0002) 0.00003
Female HH head 0.08 0.01
(0.11) 0.02
HH head eco. inactive 0.60*** 0.10***
(0.14) 0.02
HH income (£ 1,000) -0.02*** -0.003***
(0.003) 0.001
Number of adults 0.086 0.01
(0.058) 0.01
Number of children 0.18*** 0.03***
(0.06) 0.01
Detached -1.22*** 0.18***
(0.14) 0.02
Number of rooms -0.16*** -0.03***
(0.04) 0.01
Old building -0.35 -0.05*
(0.23) 0.03
Electric Heating -0.04 -0.006
(0.12) (0.02)
Renting 0.84*** 0.15***
(0.12) 0.02
Constant -0.23
(0.48)
Log likelihood -1181.95 P(1-P)=0.17
Table 3: Results from Logistic Analysis.
Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
The results from our estimation show that, all else equal, keypad customers
tend to be older, have lower average incomes, and are more likely to be economi-
cally inactive. In addition, we nd that keypad customers tend to live in smaller
houses sharing them with more people. We also nd that households renting
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are more likely to have a keypad meter than households owning a property/at.
In terms of absolute size of the e¤ects, we nd that at the mean values of
the variables an additional life year of the household head is associated with
a 0.8 percentage point increase in the probability of uptake of a keypad meter.
An increase in property size by one room, on the other hand, is associated with
a decrease in the probability of having a keypad meter of 3 percentage points.
These ndings illustrate that despite the widespread uptake of keypad me-
ters, the di¤erences between keypad and non-keypad customers are (still) sig-
nicant.
3 The E¤ect of Pre-payment
In this section, we evaluate the e¤ect of using a keypad meter on household
electricity consumption.
3.1 Related Research
There is a large body of evidence showing that information feedback (on elec-
tricity consumption) typically leads to a decrease in household electricity use.
The research is summarised in Table 4 below.6 At the same time, little is known
about the e¤ect of pre-payment on household electricity use.
6A recent qualitative study comes from Hargreaves, Nye and Burgess (2010).
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Study Type of Information Results Comments
Darby, 2006 Direct Feedback: 5 to 15% Range of inter-
- Self-meter reading savings national studies
- Direct displays with di¤erent types
- Interactive feedback of direct feedback
Darby, 2006 Indirect Feedback: 0 to 10% Range of inter-
- Frequent bills savings national studies
- Frequent bills based on with di¤erent types
readings plus other his- of indirect feedback
torical/comparative/de-
tailed information
Wood and Electronic feedback via con- 15% 44 UK households;
Newborough, sumption indicator attached reduction focuson electricity
2003 to electric cooker. for cooking
Wood and Paper-based information pack 3%
Newborough, on electricity consumption of reduction
2003 cooking appliances and elec-
tricity savings tips
Dulleck and Information leaets on energy 7% Impact on long-run
Kaumann, e¢ ciency; introd. of energy reduction rather than short-
2004 e¢ ciency appliance certi. run demand
Table 4: Literature on Information Feedback. Table adopted and adapted
from Brophy Haney et al (2009)
An initial trial of 200 households in Northern Ireland found an average of
10% electricity saving with keypad meters (NIE Energy, 2000). However, the
households in the trial which received a new pre-payment meter were hand-held
during the process.7 This is likely to have a¤ected their consumption behaviour
- which makes it hard to judge the impact estimate in terms of its external
validity.
7The group of households was a convenience sample. In addition, they were contacted
regularly to provide feedback on their experience.
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Follow up research on a broader sample found an average of 3% saving
(NIE Energy, 2003). Yet, the evaluation involved a time of day tari¤. This
gave customers a strong incentive to save at peak times, which, again makes it
hard to draw rm conclusions about the e¤ect of pre-payment/the keypad on
household electricity use.8
The lack of research on the e¤ect of pre-payment metering is surprising: un-
derstanding whether and to what extent pre-payment (too) a¤ects household
energy consumption is important for our understanding of household consump-
tion behaviour. In addition, as pointed out by Fischer (2008), only if we un-
derstand the mechanisms that inuence household behaviour will we be able to
manage energy preservation e¤ectively.
3.2 A Matching Approach
In the following, we estimate the e¤ect of having a keypad meter on electricity
consumption.
A naive way of assessing the e¤ect of the keypad is by comparing the elec-
tricity use of households with a keypad meter and households without it. It
becomes clear very quickly, however, that this is uninformative: since the two
groups of households are very di¤erent from each other, any di¤erence in elec-
tricity use is likely to reect not only the e¤ect of having/not having a keypad
but also di¤erences in income, housing, living arrangements etc.
What we need to know to evaluate the e¤ect of the keypad is what electricity
consumption of households with a keypad meter would have been, had they not
had a keypad meter. That is, what we need to know is the counter-factual.
The evaluation problem arises, because we do not observe this counterfactual.
All we observe is the electricity consumption of households with and without a
keypad meter.
The recent evaluation literature has focused on matching estimators to over-
come this problem. (See Dehejia and Wahba, 1999 and Heckman et al, 1998).
The basic idea of matching (applied to our context) is that the bias in evaluating
the e¤ect of the keypad meter on electricity consumption is reduced when the
comparison of consumption is performed using households which are as similar
as possible.
8The literature sometimes refers to the M Power Conservation E¤ect Study(Pruitt, B.,
2004) and the Woddstock Hydro evaluation (reported in Quesnelle, K., 2004). However, we
could not nd much information on these projects - in particular little is known about the
method(s) which were used in these studies.
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3.3 Matching Formally
Suppose we have data on T keypad customers and C non-keypad customers. In
addition, suppose we have a vector X of variables which help predict whether
or not a household has a keypad meter. Given this data, we can match keypad
customers with a comparison group of (similar) non-keypad customers.
Ideally, we would match each customer using a keypad meter with a sin-
gle non-keypad customer that has an identical value of X. This is unpractical,
however, because the dimension of X might be high: as the number of character-
istics used in matching increases, the chance of nding an exact match becomes
smaller and smaller.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that matching can also be performed
using P(X) rather than X where P(X) is the probability of having a keypad
meter conditional on X, i.e. the propensity score.9 The propensity score can
be calculated for each household using standard discrete choice parametric or
semi-parametric models. We use standard parametric likelihood methods to
compute the propensity score.10
We then use the odds ratio pi=Pi/(1-Pi) where Pi is the estimated prob-
ability for a household to have a keypad meter, to construct matched pairs.11
Because it is unlikely that two individuals have the exact same score, several
matching algorithms have been suggested in the literature (Becker and Ichino,
2002). We focus on the two most popular ones: nearest neighbour matching
and kernel matching.
The nearest neighbour to the i-th household is dened as the non-keypad
household which minimises [p(Xi)-p(Xj)]^2 over all j households in the set of
non-keypad households  where p(Xn) is the predicted odds ratio for obser-
vation n. Sometimes, nearest neighbours may (still) be far apart in terms of
the distance metric between the propensity scores of households with a keypad
meter and those without.
This is why we also use a kernel estimator: it takes into account all available
information and puts a greater weight on good matches than on bad ones. That
is, it matches electricity consumption of households with a keypad meter with
that of all non-keypad households, with weights that are inversely proportional
9More specically, they show that if potential outcomes are independent of treatment
conditional on the available characteristics, they are also independent of treatment conditional
on the propensity score.
10Several studies show that the impact estimator is robust to the choice of the discrete
choice model (see e.g. Heckman et al, 1998).
11We allow for replacement.
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to the distance between the propensity scores of the keypad and non-keypad
households.
The mean impact estimator () becomes:
k = 1T
P
j2C(i)[Y
T
i  
P
j2C Y
C
j G(
pj pi
hn
)P
k2C G(
pk pi
hn
)
] (1)
where the last term can be interpreted as an estimator of the counterfactual.
YT and YC are the observed outcomes in terms of electricity consumption of
households with a keypad meter, households without it, respectively. G(.) is
a kernel function in our case the Epanechnikov kernel and hn a bandwidth
parameter.12
3.4 A Note on the data
For our estimation, we use data from the 2008/2009 Northern Ireland Continu-
ous Household Survey. In order to get a more meaningful comparison group, we
exclude all but account paying households and households paying their electric-
ity bill by cash or check from the group of non-keypad households.13 In addition,
we drop households with electriciy consumption less than 1 KWh/day.14
In Table 5, we present selected descriptive statistics for keypad and non-
keypad households.15
12 In order to increase the precision of our estimates we allow for replacement - i.e. the use
of the same comparison household for several treatment households.
13We were worried that expenditure information on customers paying by monthly instal-
ments might not reect their actual consumption. Similarly, we were concerned with the
marginal costs customers face for whom electricity is paid directly by DHSS. See Borenstein
(2009)
14A refrigerator typically uses 1-2 KWh/day, so it is implausible that an occupied primary
residence woul would fall below 1 KWh/day.
15Please note: electricity use is calculated assuming a 2.5% discount for keypad customers
and a 4% discount for account paying customers. Please note also: the CHS data explicitly
excludes arrears (or rental charges).
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PPM Account/Cash&Check
Number of Observations 746 1,174
Electricity Use (KWh/Qrtly) 753.3 786.8
(635.6) (533.8)
Age of HH head 42.08 55.36
(16.35) (18.52)
Female HH head 0.47 0.35
(0.49) (0.47)
HH head eco. inactive 0.40 0.40
(0.49) (0.49)
HH income (£ 1,000) 14,969 21,391
(15,866) (23,703)
Number of adults 1.90 2.01
(1.00) (0.96)
Number of children .67 0.46
(1.00) (0.93)
Detached 0.12 0.47
(0.33) (0.50)
Number of rooms 4.97 5.93
(1.16) (1.96)
Old building 0.04 0.11
(0.20) (0.31)
Electric Heating 0.26 0.23
(0.43) (0.42)
Renting 0.61 0.23
(0.49) (0.43)
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Keypad and Non-keypad customers in NI
3.5 Estimation
Estimating the propensity score is a crucial step in using matching as an evalu-
ation strategy. Di¤erent strategies have been adopted to choose a suitable spec-
ication of the treatment equation (see e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 1998; Smith
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and Todd et al, 1998). The underlying principle is that pre-intervention vari-
ablesshould be included in the regression which are not inuenced by whether
or not a household has a keypad meter.
The Continuous Household Survey provides a rich set of information on
household and housing characteristics. We estimate alternative logistic models
to predict whether a household has a keypad meter and select a nal model on
the basis of the likelihood function. Table 6 presents the logit regression used to
estimate the propensity score on the basis of which the matching is subsequently
done.
Variable Coe¢ cient
Age of HH head 0.05**
0.02
Age of HH head squared -0.009***
0.0001
HH head eco. inactive 0.65***
(0.15)
HH income (£ 1,000) -0.01***
0.003
Number of adults -0.04
0.06
Number of children 0.16***
0.06
Number of rooms -0.29***
0.05
Old building
Electric Heating -0.05
0.13
Renting 0.83***
0.13
Constant 0.95***
0.51
Table 6: Propensity Score Estimation.
Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
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After estimating the propensity score for households with and without a
keypad meter, we plotted them to check the common support condition (see
Lechner, 2000).16 The plots are shown in Figures 2 below. They show a good
overlap in propensity scores between households with and without a keypad
meter. We exclude households for the small area for which there is no overlap:
Figure 2: Propensity Scores
Table 7 below gives our estimate of the di¤erence in consumption between
keypad customers and account/cash/check paying customers. Our estimate
suggests a di¤erence of between 30 and 75 KWh per quarter.
Nearest Neighbour Kernerl Matching
Average Treatment E¤ect 31.70 73.76
on the Treated (40.68) (35.84)
Table 7: Average Treatment E¤ect from Matching Estimator
That is, our ndings suggest that households with a keypad meter tend
to consume between 30 and 75 KWh more electricity than comparable ac-
count/cash/check paying households.
16The balancing hypothesis is not satised for all variables in the highest block (block 9).
To check the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the e¤ect of having a keypad meter
using only observations in the region of thick support.
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This nding is robust to di¤erent specications of the propensity score and
di¤erent matching algorithms. In addition, we re-estimated the e¤ect of having
a keypad meter using only households in the region of thick support(with a
propensity score between 0.20 and 0.80). What we nd is that the thick support
estimates are very similar to our baseline results.17
Finding a higher electricity use for keypad customers is suprising: On the one
hand, keypad meters come with a 2.5% discount compared to standard credit.
On the other hand, this compares to a 4% discount for direct debit customers.
In addition, even if we abstract from direct debit - given the relatively low
price elasiticy of electricity18 - it is very unlikely that the lower tari¤ for keypads
can explain the entire di¤erence (of between X and Y percent) in electricity use
between keypad and non-keypad customers.
What is more: keypad meters come with information feedback on electric-
ity use. In addition, the meters are associated with higher transaction costs:
every time a customer needs additional credit, he/she has to travel to an out-
let.19 Both of these aspects suggest that electricity consumption should be lower
(rathert than higher) for keypad customers.
3.6 Unobserved Characteristics
One possible explanation for our nding is that one of our key identication
assumption does not hold. The assumption is that conditional on all observed
household characteristics, whether a household uses a keypad meter or not is
independent of its electricity use without a keypad.
One reason why our identication assumption may not hold is that there is
some unobservable component which a¤ects both whether a household uses a
keypad meter and how much electricity it consumes. This could be for example
the (unobserved) ability to manage ones electricity use.
If households which are worse in managing their electricity use are both 
more likely to use a keypad meter and more likely to have a higher electricity
consumption in the absence of a keypad meter, then our matching estimator
may nd no negative (or even a positive) e¤ect of having a keypad meter on
electricity use even if it does have a negative e¤ect.
17Specically, what we nd is an ATT of 64.1 using the nearest neighbour algorithm and
an ATT of 70.0 using our kernel algorithm.
18Price elasticity for electricity is typically estimated signicantly below 1. See e.g. Lijesen
(2007); Halvorsen and Larsen (2001)
19The extent of these transaction costs will become clear(er) in the next section.
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The problem is: by denition, we cannot test the e¤ect of an unobserved
component on our estimation result. That is, we cannot test whether our es-
timation results are biased. What we can do, however, is test how much an
unobserved component (like the ability to manage ones electricity use) would
have to inuence a households decision to use a keypad meter and electricity
consumption to signicantly alter our estimation results.
The basic idea is that, if we can show that all congurations of the unbserved
component which lead to a reversal of our ndings can be considered unlikely,
we can be reasonably sure that our estimates reect the true e¤ect of using
a keypad meter on electricity use (rather than the combined e¤ect of using a
keypad meter and, say, being bad in managing ones electricity use).
3.7 Robustness Test
The main steps of our test can be summarised as follows: We rst make di¤erent
assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved component (U) in our
sample. We then test under which assumptions of U, the estimated e¤ect of
using a keypad meter on electricity use becomes negative. Finally, we discuss
how plausible these assumptions are. The approach was rst suggested by Ichino
et al (2008).
To implement the test, we assume that U is binary and iid distributed. This
allows us without loss of generality20 to characterize the distribution of U
by means of four parameters:
 P11=Pr(U=1jT=1, Y=1, X)
 P10=Pr(U=1jT=1, Y=0, X)
 P01=Pr(U=1jT=0, Y=1, X)
 P00=Pr(U=1jT=0, Y=0, X)
which are the probabilities that U=1 in each of the 4 groups dened by
whether households have a keypad meter or not and whether households have
above mean electricity use or not.21
To test the e¤ect of a given distribution of U, we x p11-p00 at a given value
at a time. We then use these values to attribute a value of U to each individual
20 Ichino et al (2007) provide Monte Carlo simulations which show that the assumption does
not critically a¤ect the results of the robustness test.
21We also used a binary transformation using the median. Using the median does not a¤ect
the result of the sensitivity analysis).
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in our sample. To give an example: If we x p11 at 0.6, we attribute a value
of U=1 with probability 0.6 to each household with a keypad meter (T=1) and
which has above electricity use (Y=1).
We then estimate the e¤ect of having a keypad meter on electricity use 
including U as a further observed covariate. We repeat this process a large
number of times for our given set of values of p11-p00. We obtain an estimate
of the e¤ect of having a keypad meter, as the average of the estimated e¤ects
over the distribution of the simulated Us.
In Table 8 below, we show the ndings from this exercise. To reduce the
dimensionality problem of the characterization of U, we xed the probabilities
Pr(U=1) and the di¤erence d=p11-p10 at some pre-determined values. This
allows us again without loss of generality22 to fully describe the simulated
confounder by the di¤erence d=p01-p00 and s=p1:-p0:.23
s=0.1 s=0.2 s=0.3 s=0.4 s=0.5
 2(1.53;  2(2.38;  2(3.68;  2(5.80;  2(9.68;
1.69) 2.64) 4.20) 6.58) 11.68)
d=0.1 71.1 66.5 59.1 46.2 32.4
  2(1.54;1.84) (4.0) (7.1) (13.8) (17.6) (20.9)
d=0.2 66.3 55.8 39.3 17.5 -7.9
  2(2.38;3.33) (4.6) (7.2) (11.7) (19.6) (23.8)
d=0.3 61.3 41.6 -16.6 -17.2 -60.8
  2(3.90;6.54) (4.8) (9.6) (13.1) (21.4) (23.6)
d=0.4 54.3 31.2 -5.4 -47.8 -113.6
  2(5.98;15.07) (5.4) (11.0) (16.7) (20.4) (26.7)
d=0.5 48.0 15.4 -32.2 -92.6 -188.9
  2(10.30;85.57) (7.9) (12.8) (15.8) (21.8) (25.7)
Table 8: Average Treatment E¤ect from Matching Estimator with an
Unobserved Component
The table also shows the estimated values of  and   where  represents
a measure of the e¤ect of U on the probability that a household uses a keypad
meter (selection e¤ect) and   a measure of the e¤ect of U on electricity use
(outcome e¤ect).
22Since these quantities are not expected to represent a real threat for the baseline estimate,
they can be held xed and the simulated confounder U can be fully described by the di¤erence
d= p01-p00 and s=p1:-p0:.
23We only use look at d>0 and s>0. By assuming p01>p00 one can simulate a confounding
factor that has a positive e¤ect on the untreated outcome y0. Similarly, by setting p1:>p0:
One can simulate a confounding factor that has a positive e¤ect on treatment assignment.
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The key nding from the table is that even if we allow U to be distributed
in a way that it has a large e¤ect on the probability that a household uses a
keypad meter (=7.6) and a large e¤ect on electricity use ( =3.8), the estimate
of the corresponding e¤ect of using a keypad meter on electricity use remains
positive.24
To reverse our (baseline) estimate to give a negative e¤ect of about 70 KWh,
U needs to have a very (and implausibly) large e¤ect on the probability that
a household uses a keypad meter and/or its electricity use. More specically,
U needs to increase the relative probability of using a keypad meter () by
a factor greater than 10.3 (6.6) and the relative probability of having above
average electricity consumption ( ) by a factor greater than 6.5.(23.2).
For comparison, if we model U to resemble our electric heatingdummy (a
dummy indicating whether a household has at least one child), we get a selection
of =1.23 (2.09) and an outcome e¤ect of  =1.07 (3.44). This suggests that it is
unlikely that our nding that using a keypad meter tends to increase electricity
consumption is driven by some unobserved component.
4 Exploring peoples top-up behaviour
In the last section, we found that having a keypad meter tends to increase
electricity consumption. In this section, we describe how people use their keypad
meters: we look at how often they top-up their meters and how much money
they typically put on their meter.
What we are interested is to nd a cue/anomaly in peoples behaviour which
can help us explain the positive e¤ect of having a keypad meter on household
electricity consumption. We test for such a link more rigorously in the nal
section of the paper.
For our analysis we use data from NIE Energy on 10,124 randomly cho-
sen households.25 This corresponds to roughly 2.4% of all keypad customers
in Northern Ireland. Our dataset tracks households over 18 months (between
1.6.2008 and 30.11.2009). To have a clear panel data-set, customers who have
moved house within this period were not included in the sample.26
24Please note: the matching uses our kernel algorithm. Standard errors are calculated using
the between-imputation variance.
25The data was given to us on a condential basis.
26Our data set includes information on when households purchase top-up; what amount
they purchase; what channel they use (i.e. online; phone; Call Centre; IVR_Online; Paypoint;
Payzone; or Post o¢ ce); and which tari¤ they are on. In addition, we can link each household
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4.1 A simple model of peoples top-up behaviour
From a theoretical perspective, an intuitive way to think about peoples top-up
beavhiour is in terms of an application of the Baumol Tobin model (Baumol,
1952; Tobin, 1956; Romer, 1986). It suggests that people trade-o¤ the costs
and benets of putting money on their meter. The main benet is convenience:
people put money on their meter to avoid having to purchase top-up every time
they need electricity. The cost of this convenience is forgone interest.
To see how people trade-o¤ these benets and costs, consider a person who
spends £ Y on electricity over the course of a year. For simplicity, assume that
the price level is constant, so real spending is constant over the year. Suppose
the individual makes N top-ups and spends £ Y/N on each top-up. Suppose that
our individual spends the credit she purchases gradually over the next 1/Nth of
the year.
In addition, suppose that the cost of topping-up ones meter is some xed
amount F. We can view F as representing the value of time spent to purchase
top up (which means to travel to a store; call a helpline; or go online to purchase
a vend code before entering it into ones meter at home). Finally, let i denote
the interest rate; we can interpret i as a measure of the opportunity cost of
holding money on ones meter (since money on a meter does not bear interest).
Now we can analyse the optimal choice of N, which determines the optimal
amount of credit to be purchased. For any N, the average amount of money held
is Y/2N, so the forgone interest is (Y/2N)i. Because F is the cost per top-up,
the cost of top-ups over the course of a year is FN. This means, the total cost
our individual bears is:
(Y=2N)i+ FN (2)
which is the sum of the forgone interest and the cost of purchasing top-up.
Simple minimisation gives the optimal value of N and average top-up amount:
the optimal value of N is the square root of Yi/2F; the corresponding average
top-up amount is the square root of YF/2i. This means that an individual pur-
chases more credit at a time if the xed cost of purchasing credit, F, are higher;
if her expenditure Y is higher; or if the interest rate i is lower.
to a post-code. This allows us to match our data with the Northern Ireland Neighbourhood
Information Service (NINIS) database a locational data set that contains information on a
large number of socio-economic variables.
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4.2 Emprical puzzle
Two testable implications follow from our model: It suggests that an average
customer
 will purchase credit worth £ 230 about 2.3 times a year and
 will respond to a change in expenditure by changing both: the number of
top-ups and average top-up amount.
Take the average annual electricity bill in Northern Ireland which is £ 522.
Suppose that it takes our individual on average about 10 minutes to top-up her
keypad meter;27 that she has a value of time equal to her average hourly salary
of £ 12;28 and earns 4 percent annual interest on balances held at her bank.
Plugging this information into our model, we nd that, on average, our
customer should purchase credit worth £ 230 about 2.3 times a year and hold
an average of £ 115 worth of credit on her meter.
This contrasts starkly with the behaviour we observe: people top up their
meters ca 45 times a year with, on average, £ 13 at a time. Figure 3 plots the
average amounts of credit people purchase every time they top-up their meter
for the time period 1.6.2008-30.11.2009 (which includes 2 increases in minimum
top-up).
27More than 90% of customers top-up their meters in stores. So while it is possible to spend
less time on average top-up ones meter using online top-ups, 10 minutes seem a fair estimate
for the average time spend to purchase credit.
28Source: Northern Ireland Statistics
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Figure 3: Distribution of Mean Top-up Amounts
The gure shows that the vast majority of customers (96%) top up their
meters on average by less than £ 30 at a time. Only 5 in 1000 purchase credit
in excess of £ 50.
The second testable implication of our model is that a change in expenditure
Y should lead to an equal change in the number of top-ups and average top-up
amount. (This follows from the formula of the optimal value of N and average
top-up amount). Again, the prediction is at odds with the data. Table 9 below
shows the change in the number of top-ups and average top-up amount from:
 June to July 2008
 September to October 2008;
 December 2008 to January 2009.
 September 2009 to October 2009
It shows that people respond to increases in tari¤ mainly through increases
in the number of top-up trips and much less through increases in the average
top-up amount. The table also shows that this cannot be explained by slow
adjustment processes whereby people learn about the increase in tari¤ over
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time. We nd little adjustment in the two months following the increase in
tari¤.
Change: tari¤ Change: # of top-
ups
Change: average
top-up amount
06/08-07/08 0.01588 4,045 £ 0.01
(14.0%) (10.5%) (0.1%)
07/08-08/08 0 1,489 £ 0.19
(0%) (3.5%) (2%)
08/08-09/08 0 37 £ 0.19
(0%) (0%) (1.9%)
09/08-10/08 0.04319 12,428 £ 0.58
(33.3%) (28%) (5.8%)
10/08-11/08 0 480 £ 0.44
(0%) (0.8%) (4%)
11/08-12/08 0 -1,740 £ 0.85
(0%) (-3%) (7.7%)
12/08-01/09 -0.01863 -2,958 -£ 0.74
(-10.8%) (-5.2%) (-6.2%)
01/09-02/09 0 -1,543 -£ 0.12
(0%) (-2.9%) (-1%)
02/09-03/09 0 -1,973 -£ 0.23
(0%) (-3.8%) (-2.1%)
09/09-10/09 -0.768 -1,287 -£ 0.17
(-5.0%) (-2.2%) (-1.7%)
10/09-11/09 0 784 £ 0.39
(0%) (1.7%) (3.6%)
Table 9: Overall response to changes in Tari¤s
Interestingly, when it comes to decreases in tari¤s, we nd that, in line with
the predictions of our model, people respond to the change in tari¤ through
decreases in average top-up amount as much as through decreases in the number
of top-ups.
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4.3 Changing the parameters of the model
One possible explanation for the discrepancy between the predictions of our
model and the top-up behaviour we observe is the choice of parameters. For
example, it may be that average wages measure the opportunity cost of time
correctly only if a customer actually works: If he/she is not active in the labour
market, as is the case for a signicant number of keypad customers, wages may
be a rather crude proxy for their valuation of time.29
It is also possible that people tend to purchase their top-up when they do
their grocery shopping. In this case, arguably, the additional time spent on
purchasing top-up is likely to be small and, hence, the marginal (opportunity)
cost of doing so low. There are two problems with these arguments: The rst
one is that while changing the parameters of our model can reduce the di¤erence
between the models predictions and actual top-up behaviour, it cannot explain
the full di¤erence.
Figure 4 shows the optimal top-up amount for low and high wage customers
(£ 6, £ 24 per hour) and low and high interest rates (2% and 6%).
29 In addition, wages may not capture the true valuation of time even for those who are
active in the labour market: To the extent that direct-income compensation for additional
time expenditures are generally available only for the self-employed and other autonomous
individuals, wages may not reect most peoples valuation of time outside working hours
(which is presumably when they purchase top-up for their meters).
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Figure 4: Changing the Parameters of the Model
The gure shows that in no scenario of wages and/or interest rate the optimal
top-up amount drops below £ 130. In fact, even if we assume the most extreme
case (not shown) with low income, high interest rates and 1 minute per top-up,
we arrive at an optimal top-up amount of £ 50, which exceeds the average top-up
amount of 99% of customers in Northern Ireland.
The second problem with the argument that our anomalies are simply a
matter of choosing the right parameters is that customers tend to adjust to
increases in tari¤s almost exclusively by increasing the number of top-up trips.
As outlined above, if our model were an accurate description of how people
choose to top-up their meters and we simply had to nd the right parameters
to t it, then increases in tari¤ should result in an equal change in the number
of top-up trips and the average top-up amount purchased.
4.4 Liquidity Constraints
An alternative explanation for our two anomalies is liquidity constraints. The
idea is that people may be very bad in saving and so make top-ups whenever
they have money (rather than after saving for one big top-up). In the light of our
earlier discussion and the nding that keypad customers tend to be relatively
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poorer, liquidity constraints seem to be a realistic explanation for the low top-
ups of some customers and the inability to adjust to increases in tari¤ by
increasing (also) the average top-up amount.
However, liquidity constraints cannot explain why also customers in the
highest ACORN groups (comfortably well o¤, urban prosperity, wealthy
achievers) come nowhere close to the optimal top-up amount suggested by our
framework; nor why customers in these groups show the same (unexpected)
adjustment process to changes in tari¤ as all customers(described above).
Figure 5 shows the average top-up amount for each ACORN group.
Figure 5: Distribution of Mean Top-up Amounts by ACORN Groups
Table 10 below shows the change in the number of top-ups and average top-
up amount as a response to changes in tari¤ for ACORN groups comfortably
well-o¤, urban prosperity, and wealthy achievers.
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Change: tari¤ Change: # of top-
ups
Change: average
top-up amount
06/08-07/08 0.01588 1218 -£ 0.08
(14.0%) (10%) (-0.7%)
07/08-08/08 0 637 £ 0.21
(0%) (4.8%) (1.9%)
08/08-09/08 0 -15 £ 0.31
(0%) (0%) (2.7%)
09/08-10/08 0.04319 4111 £ 0.55
(33.3%) (29%) (4.5%)
10/08-11/08 0 8 £ 0.62
(0%) (0%) (5%)
11/08-12/08 0 -575 £ 1
(0%) (-3.1%) (7.5%)
12/08-01/09 -0.01863 -877 -£ 0.87
(-10.8%) (-4.8%) (-6.3%)
01/09-02/09 0 -498 -£ 0.22
(0%) (-2.9%) (-1.7%)
02/09-03/09 0 -619 -£ 0.31
(0%) (-3.7%) (-2.4%)
09/09-10/09 -0.768 -434 £ 0.18
(-5.0) (-2.8%) (-1.3%)
10/09-11/09 0 394 £ 0.51
(0%) (2.6%) (4.1%)
Table 10: Overall response to changes in Tari¤s for
highest ACORN groups
It is possible that the ACORN labels do not adequately describe the nancial
situation in each group and that even individuals classied as wealthy achievers
are to a large extent poor. If this were true, however, we would expect to nd
signicant intra-month di¤erences in top-up behaviour. This is not the case.30
30More specically, to the extent that people tend to receive their salaries at the end of the
month and social security benets every fortnight, in a world with severe liquidity constraints
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4.5 Expectations
Another possible explanation for the small top-up amounts is that customers
are trying to game the top-up system. For example, because a change in tari¤
becomes e¤ective only after a customer has entered a certain code into her meter,
and because this code is typically combined with her vend code, it is possible
that households are trying to sustain large stocks of credit on their meter (by
making many small top-ups) to so smoothen an increase in tari¤ by postponing
the rst top-up after the increase in tari¤.
Table 11 below shows the changes in tari¤ between 1.6.2008 and 30.11.2009.
In order to test the hypothesis of hordingwe compare the average number of
top-ups and top-up amounts before the largest increase in tari¤ (on 1.10.2008;
its announcement, respectively) and afterwards. We do not nd any evidence
for signicant hording behaviour among a large number of customers. Instead,
while the average top-up amount remained almost the same, as discussed earlier,
the number of top-ups increased to account for the higher tari¤.
Period Unit Rate
01/06/08 - 30/06/08 £ 0.11373
01/07/08 - 30/09/08 £ 0.12961
01/10/08 - 31/12/08 £ 0.17280
01/01/09 - 30/09/09 £ 0.15417
01/10/09 - £ 0.14649
Table 11: Changes in tari¤ over time
We also compare the average top-up amount between 1st July 2008 and
1st October 2008 with that between 1st October 2008 and 1st January 2009.
The idea is to test whether the small top-up amounts can be explained by
expectations of falling electricity tari¤s. Again, we nd no evidence for strategic
behaviour.31
even among individuals in the highest ACORN groups, we would expect to nd signicantly
higher average top-up amounts in the last ten days of a month than in the ten days before
the last ten days; in the rst week than in the second week, respectively.
However, when we compare the total top-up volume (number of top-ups and average top-up
amount) in the last 10 days of each month with that in the ten days before that for individuals
in the highest ACORN groups (comfortably well o¤, urban prosperity, wealthy achievers)
and in the rst week of the month with that in the second week (for the same individuals),
we nd very modest evidence for liquidity constraints.
The change in the number of top-up trips in the last ten days (rst week of the month)
and the 10 days before that (second week) is -2.5% (-0.4%). The corresponding change in the
average top-up amount is +3.5% (-1.8%)
31 In addition, expectations of falling tari¤s cannot explain why people adjust to changes in
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4.6 Aversion to lose top-up
Yet another possible explanation for the small top-ups is that people are afraid
of losing their top-up either by losing their top-up voucher before entering it
into their meter or through a technical problem of their meter.
One advantage of the new keypad system over the old system is that every
keypad voucher works on exactly one meter only. This makes theft pointless.
In addition, should a customer lose a top-up voucher, he/she can always get a
reprint free of charge. (The same voucher code cannot be entered more than
once). This excludes the possibility of (rational) aversion to lose ones top-up
voucher as a possible explanation for our anomalies.
Similarly, there is little reason to believe that fear of losing money that is
stored on ones meter as a result of a technical defect explains the small top-ups
we observe: First of all, there is no evidence from the side of NIE Energy or
customer protection groups that problems of this sort are common. In addition,
even if a problem should occur, it is relatively straightforward for NIE Energy
to get a sense of the loss involved from their records.
4.7 Commitment Device
Finally, it is possible that people use the small top-up amounts as a commitment
device to save electricity. The idea can be illustrated as follows: Suppose an
individual has the following utility function with (, )-preferences (see Laibson,
1997 and ODonoghue and Rabin, 1999):
Ut = ut + ut+1 + 
2ut+2 + 
3ut+3 + ::: (3)
The main feature of these preferences is the  term which ensures  for
 <1 that the discounting between the present and the future is higher than
between any future time periods.
The main implication of this model of individual preferences is that they
introduce a conict between an impatient present self and a patient future
self. To give an example: Suppose electricity preservation has an immediate
cost c at time 1 and a delayed pay-o¤ b at t=2. How much does a customer
want to preserve? The customers preservation decision at t=0 i.e. one period
ahead can be stated as follows: He/She will preserve if 2b2   c1  0; or
2b2   c1  0
tari¤s almost exclusively by changing the number of top-ups.
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Now, how much does a costumer actually preserve? At t=1 the customer
preserves if b2   c1  0 - which is smaller than the di¤erence at t=0. So,
compared to the desired, optimal level of preservation at t=0, a (, )-customer
preserves too little at t=1. The problem is that, because of the higher impatience
of the present selfoptimal contingent plans are not followed through.32
In response to the conict between an impatient present selfand patient
future self, a sophisticated agent will look for a commitment device. A com-
mitment device is an arrangement entered into by an agent which restricts his
or her future choice set by making certain choices more expensive [...](Bryan
et al, 2009). Commitment devices can take on a variety of forms. One form
which might help us explain the small top-up amounts we observe is rationing
(Wertenbroch, 1998). The idea is that customers self-impose a constraint on
their consumption by rationing their purchasing quantities.
The rationing rule could say, for example: Never buy more than £ 10 worth
of top-up at a time and never buy top-up more than once a week. Such a
rule implies that consumption at higher rates can only occur at the expense of
incurring a cost, which is either the psychological cost of breaking ones own
rule (see Thaler, 1985 or Heath and Loewenstein, 1991) or the cost of being
without electricity until the next scheduled top-up.
It can be shown relatively easily that, if we assume that the psychological
cost of breaking ones own rule is constant, then we can get a situation in
which there is an upper bound on how long a top-up interval can be and so
how large top-ups can be. The idea is that there are limits as to how strict a
customer can make his or her commitment device by increasing the threat of
being without electricity: if a payment schedule is long and the threat of being
without electricity (at the end) high, a customer can always opt for breaking
her own rule and so circumvent the higher cost of being without electricity.
The problem with this argument is that, while it can explain why customers
choose relatively short top-up intervals and, by extension, small top-up amounts,
it is inconsistent with peoples adjustment behaviour to changes in tari¤: The
commitment argument implies an optimal top-up amount for a given tari¤. The
way people adjust to changes in tari¤, however, implies that they choose di¤erent
top-up amounts at a given tari¤ depending on the timing. To give an example,
32This line of reasoning has been used to explain seemingly irrational behaviour in a broad
range of circumstances, ranging from saving too little for retirement, eating too much choco-
late and not going to the gym often enough (Harris and Laibson, 2003; Wertenbroch, 2002;
Dellavigna and Malmendier, 2004).
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because of the asymmetric way people adjust to increases and decreases in tari¤,
a customer will choose a di¤erent top-up amount given tari¤ X at time A and
B, if between A and B the tari¤ changes from X to Y and back to X.
5 Exploring the link between peoples top-up
behaviour and their electricity consumption
In the last sections we raised two empirical puzzles. We found that:
1. having a keypad meter tends to increase (rather than decrease) electricity
consumption - despite information feedback on householdselectricity use
and higher transaction costs;
2. households tend to purchase very small top-up amounts every time they
purchase top-up and adjust to increases in tari¤ almost exclusively by
increasing the number of top-up trips
In this section, we explore whether there is a link between these two ndings.
Specically, we ask whether and to what extent the e¤ect of pre-payment me-
tering on electricity consumption can be explained in the same way as peoples
top-up behaviour.
5.1 Cost Salience
One explanation for our two anomalies is that people perceive costs di¤erently
depending on whether they pay, say, 10 times £ 10 or £ 100 once: If paying 10
times £ 10 feels more trivial than paying £ 100 once, people might end up using
more (rather than less) electricity under a pre-payment scheme - which allows
them to disaggregate their electricity spending in whatever way they want.
Similarly, if paying 10 times £ 10 feels more trivial than paying £ 100 once,
people (interested in minimising the negative hedonic impact of paying) can
be expected to prefer relatively small top-ups to larger top-ups and to prefer
adjusting to increases in tari¤ by increasing the number of top-up trips rather
than the average top-up amount.
There is little systematic research on this idea33 - with the exception of
Gourvilles work on the pennies-a-day-strategy. In a series of experiments,
33The idea that the same amount can be perceived di¤erently, depending on whether it
is disaggregated or aggregated, features in several studies. Hardly ever, however, it is made
explicit. Instead, in most cases (Gourville, 1998; Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998; Klee, 2006) it
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Gourville (1998, 2003) showed that framing a donation request of £ 100 as mere
27p a dayis e¤ective: he nds that the percentage of subjects agreeing to donate
is signicantly higher when they are asked to give up 27 p a daycompared to
(the equivalent) £ 100 a year.
There is also some anecdotal evidence which suggests that people may per-
ceive costs di¤erently depending on the level of aggregation of the payment.
Loewenstein and ODonohue (2006) provide the following example:
"Consider two means of borrowing: (1) take out a loan of $10,000 on January
1 to be used for purchases over the next 12 months; or (2) slowly accumulate a
credit card balance of $10,000. The standard economic model would say that
a person ought to be (roughly) indi¤erent between the two options. But we
suspect that many customers who accumulate $10,000 of credit card debt over
a year would not have been willing to take out a $10,000 loan at the start of the
year. Intuitively, they do not want to borrow and spend an extra $10,000, and
so when faced with an aggregate decision of how much to borrow this year, they
would choose much less. But when they make a series of disaggregated small
borrowing decisions, people often end up borrowing a lot.
5.2 Linking Top-up Behaviour and Electricity Consump-
tion
One testable implication of our hypothes is that there should be a link between
peoples top-up behaviour and their electricity consumption: if smaller top-
up amounts are perceived as more trivial, we should nd that an (exogenous)
increase in top-up amount should lead to (an increase in cost salience and) a
decrease in electricity use.
To assess the link between an (exogenous) increase in top-up amount and
electricity use, we analyse the e¤ect of an increase in the minimum top-up
is implicitly assumed that the main features of Kahneman and Tverskys (1979) value function
which are that people prefer to: i) separate gains (because the gain function is concave); ii)
integrate losses (because the loss function is convex); integrate smaller losses with larger gains
(to o¤set loss aversion); and segregate small gains (silver lining) from large losses (because
the gain function is steepest at the origin, the utility of a small gain can exceed the utility of
slightly reducing a large loss) apply to general market transactions (such that people code
the acquisition of a good as a gain and the forgone money as a loss).
Both Kahneman and Tversky (1984) and Thaler (1985, 1999) reject this idea. Thaler (1999)
provides the following example of why he considers viewing costs as losses as descriptively
inaccurate: consider a thirsty consumer who would rather have a can of soda than one dollar
and is standing in front of a vending machine that sells soda for 75 cents. Clearly the purchase
makes her better o¤, but it might be rejected if the payment were cognitively multiplied by
2.25 (an estimate of the coe¢ cient of loss aversion).
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amount. The change in minimum top-up took place on 15 May 2009. It applied
only to top-ups purchased online or via a call centre and meant an increase in
minimum top-up from £ 2 to £ 15.
5.3 Empirical framework
One simple regression method to evaluate the e¤ect of a change in minimum
top-up is based on a comparison of electricity consumption of those who had to
change their normal top-up behaviour before and after the change in minimum
top-up. For example, consider:
yit = + Dt + "it; i = i; :::; N ; t = 0; 1::: (5)
Where Dt=1 in period 1 (post-intervention), Dt=0 in period 0 (pre-interven-
tion), and yit measures electricity consumption. The regression estimated from
this model will yield an estimate of the policy impact parameter . However, for
this parameter to be consistent, we need that our sample remains comparable
over time.
If we allowed  to vary between the two periods e.g. as a result of seasonal
variation  would be confounded with this change and no longer reect solely
the e¤ect of a change in minimum top-up on consumption. That is, looking
at how consumption changed before and after a change in minimum top-up is
uniformative if consumption would have changed even in the absence of the
change in minimum top-up.
One way to improve on this design is to include an additional comparison
group; one not impacted by the change in minimum top-up. The idea is that,
if this comparison group is similar to the group which is a¤ected by the change
in minimum top-up (treatment group), it can tell us something about how
electricity consumption of our treatment group would have evolved, had it not
been a¤ected by the change in minimum top-up.
Formally, using Meyers (1995) notation, the relevant regression now is:
yjit = + 1Dt + 
1Dj + Djt + "
j
it; i = 1; :::; N ; t = 0; 1; ::: (6)
Where j is the group superscript, Dj=1 if j equals 1 and Dj=0 otherwise,
Dtj=1 if both j and t equal 1 and Dtj=0 otherwise. " is a zero-mean constant-
variance error term. The equation does not include covariates, but they can be
added.
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What this relation implies is that, for the group for whom the change in
minimum top-up was binding, we have pre-intervention
y1i0 = + 
1D1 + "1i0 (7)
And post-intervention
y1i1 = + 1 + 
1D1 +  + "1i1 (8)
Which suggests an impact of
y1i1   y1i0 = 1 +  + "1i1   "1i0 (9)
The corresponding equations for the untreatedgroup (within our frame-
work) are
y0i0 = + "
0
i0 (10)
And
y1i1 = + 
1 + "0i0 (11)
Which suggests
y0i1   y0i0 = 1 + "0i1   "0i0 (12)
The rst di¤erence shows the problem from before: rather than providing an
estimate of the impact of a change in minimum top-up (), what we get when
comparing our treatedgroup before and after the change in minimum top-up
is a composite of some other change (1) and the actual impact ().
The second di¤erence provides us with a way of getting rid of this bias: As
the rst di¤erence it includes the period-1 specic e¤ect 1; which means that
we can eliminate 1 from the rst di¤erence by taking the di¤erence between
Equations (9) and (12):
(y1i1   y1i0)  (y0i1   y0i0) =  + ("1i1   "1i0)  ("0i1   "0i0) (13)
Assuming that E[("1i1 "1i0)-( "0i1 "0i0)] equals zero, we can obtain an unbiased
estimate of  by the sample average of (y1i1 y1i0) (y0i1 y0i0). This method uses
di¤erences in di¤erences. The identifying assumption of the approach is that
the time trend in consumption of the treatment group and comparison group is
the same in the absence of the change in minimum top-up.
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5.4 Sample Description
Our discussion in the last section suggest that to assess the e¤ect of a change in
minimum top-up, we need to know for whom the change has lead to a change
in top-up behaviour i.e. we need to identify our treatment group. In theory
it is clear who this is: All those who would have purchased top-up online worth
less than £ 15, but now purchase top-ups (still online) worth £ 15 or more.
The practical di¢ culty is that we do not observe what people would have
done, had there not been a change in minimum top-up. However, because quite
a large fraction of customers always top-up the same amount using the same
payment channel, we can get a good sense of who would have purchased top-up
online < £ 15 by looking at what people did in the three months before the
change in minimum top-up.
In order to identify our treatment group, we divide our sample along the
following dimensions: First, we separate out customers who tend to purchase
top-up online. (This includes top-ups purchased via the internet and call cen-
tres). We say that a household purchases top-up online, if in the three months
before the change in minimum top-up, it makes 50% or more of its purchases
using the internet (or a call centre).
Secondly, we split the sample by median top-up amount dropping all ob-
servations with a median top-up amount > £ 15 in the three months before the
change in minimum top-up. Finally, in order to leave only people in the sample
who tend to spend more or less the same amount every time they purchase top-
up, we exclude all those for whom the mean absolute deviation from the mean
is larger than 1.5 in the three months before the change in minimum top-up.34
This leaves us with a sample size of 162. (See Table 12 for details).
Now that we have dened our treatment group, we need to nd a group
which is similar to our treatment groupexcept for the fact that it has not been
a¤ected by the change in minimum top-up. A natural candidate is Medium
Top-uppers: We dene it like our treatment groupwith the exception that
people in this group tend to make top-ups between £ 15 and £ 30 (rather than
between £ 2 and £ 15). Because the change in minimum top-up has been from £ 2
to £ 15, Medium Top-uppersare unlikely to have been a¤ected by the change
in minimum top-up. Table 12 below summarizes the two groups.35
34MAD of 1.5 is the minimum MAD before the sample size drops dramatically.
35We have also tried alternative comparison groups - such as O­ ine Top-uppers - which
we dened in the same way as our treatment group except that people in this group tend
to make their top-ups o­ ine (i.e. using Paypoints, Payzones and/or Post o¢ ces) rather than
36
Small top-ups: Medium top-ups:
Median top-up <£ 15 Median top-up £ 15<£ 30
Online customers Individuals: 162 Individuals: 298
Mean amt: 10.69 (0.10) Mean amt: 21.27 (0.11)
Mean amt2: 9.87 (0.20) Mean amt2: 21.85 (0.22)
Table 12: Sample description Treatment vs Comparison Group
The table shows the number of customers in each sub-sample, their mean
top-up amount over the whole period (mean amt) and the mean top-up amount
in the three months prior to the increase in minimum top-up (mean amt2).
5.5 Graphical Analysis
Because keypad meters do not require meter readings, we have no direct infor-
mation on householdselectricity consumption. What we do know is i) when
households purchase top-up ii) how much top-up they purchase and iii) what
their tari¤ is at any point in time. Assuming that households tend to purchase
top-up always when they have roughly the same amount of credit left on their
meter, this information allows us to work out what their consumption is.
In Figure 6, we show the average electricity consumption for all individuals
calculated in this way.36
the internet. However, a simple logistic analysis - using data from the Northern Ireland
Neighbourhood Information Service - suggets that while there are no signicant di¤erences
between our treatment groupand Medium Top-uppersthere are considerable cross-sectional
di¤erences between our treatment group and O­ ine Top-uppers. In addition, a plot of
pre-intervention consumption showed more similarlity between Medium Top-uppersand our
treatment groupthan between O­ ine Top-uppersand our treatment group. The results
from these analyses are available upon request.
36One possible di¢ culty that might arise from the construction of our data in this way is
that the calculation of monthly consumption gures becomes increasingly imprecise as top-up
amounts increase. The reason is that, ceteris paribus, the probability for a top-up to start
and end in the same month decreases as top-up amounts increase which makes it harder to
attribute top-up to a particular month. Given the small top-ups, we do not expect this to
signicantly alter our results. (Top-ups between £ 10 and £ 15 tend to take place on a weekly
schedule).
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Figure 6: Mean Monthly Consumption
Figures 7 shows the average monthly electricity consumption for our main
sub-samples: Treatment Group; and Medium Top-uppers. What we nd is
that consumption in the two groups follows each other relatively closely before
the change in minimum top-up. After the introduction of the new minimum
top-up amount, however, we nd a decrease in consumption in the treatment
group, while consumption for Medium Top-uppersincreases.
This nding is in line with our expectation: As people have to purchase
larger amounts of top-up, they start paying more attention to their electricity
spending and, hence, decrease their consumption.
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Figure 7: Mean Montly Consumption - Treatment and Comparison
Group
One alternative explanation for our nding is that it is driven by liquidity
constraints. As discussed earlier, some people may be bad at saving for larger
top-ups and so be forced to stretchtheir credit over a longer period of time as
a result of the change in minimum top-up. Yet, this possibility seems unlikely:
Customers always have the possibility to just purchase their top-up o­ ine (with
a minimum top-up amount of £ 2 at the time).
In addition, looking at the distribution of customers in our Treatment
Group, we nd that customers in ACORN category hard pressedare largely
under-represented (28%), while customers in ACORN categories comfortably
well-o¤(25%) and wealthy achieversare over-represented (28%).
In the next section, we go through the analysis again using a regression
analysis. This allows us to determine how likely it is that our ndings are due
to chance only and allows us to test the appropriateness of the research design.
5.6 Regression Analysis
Let average monthly consumption be denoted by Y. Variables ST is equal to
one if a customer typically purchases small top-ups (as dened earlier) zero
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otherwise. TT is equal to 1 after the increase in minimum top-up zero other-
wise. Let X denote a vector of additional covariates. We estimate variants of the
following linear model, which generalises the Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence estimation
strategy set out earlier:
Y = + 1TT + 2ST + 1TT  ST + X + "
In this specication, the second level interaction (1) captures the treat-
ment e¤ect of the natural experiment. It equals the DD estimate. As a refer-
ence, specication 1 in Table 13 reports our treatment e¤ect with no controls.
Specication 2 replicates 1, controlling for top-up amount and month xed ef-
fects. Specication 3 includes a set of control variables. For this, we match our
data with information from the Northern Ireland Neighbourhood Information
Service (NINIS).37 All three specications show that the change in minimum
top-up led to a signicant reduction in electricity consumption in our treatment
group relative to the comparison group.
More specically, what we nd is that electricity consumption in our treat-
ment group decreased by about 15 KWh as a result of the change in minimum
top-up. Assuming the model is correctly specied the probability that such a
result could have happened by chance is only ca 5%. In specication 4, we
estimate an analogous model in logs instead of levels. An advantage of the log
specication is that it may be a better model for comparison across groups with
di¤erent baseline quantities. The log specication yields a slightly larger esti-
mate than the levels models: a decline in monthly electricity consumption of
7%.
37NINIS is a census-based, locational data-set that contains information on a large number
of socio-economic variables.
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Variable Spec (1) Spec (2) Spec (3) Spec (4) Spec (5)
Treatment -10.84* -14.66* -15.55** -0.07** -19.13*
(6.15) (7.80) (7.84) (0.036) (10.20)
Top-up amount FE -37.11*** -41.34*** -0.17*** -44.06***
(14.17) (14.27) (0.054) (18.31)
Month FE 8.01* 8.65* 0.023** 13.79*
(4.64) (4.64) (0.022) (5.66)
Higher Prof. Occ. 1.06
(1.99)
Lower Prof. Occ. -0.17
(0.55)
Unemployment rate -1.63
(3.12)
Over 60 0.26
(1.28)
Married 1.07
(0.76)
Children 1.19
(0.86)
High Level of Edu. -0.94
(2.12)
No Education 1.25
(1.46)
Table 13: Dif-in-Dif Estimates.
Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
To further probe into the possibility that our estimates are driven by liq-
uidity constraint, we re-estimate our model using only individuals from high
ACORN groups (comfortably well-o¤, urban prosperity, wealthy achievers). We
nd a statistically signicant estimate in the ball-park of the estimates before
(specication 5).
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5.7 Robustness Checks
A concern in Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence analysis is that the model is mis-specied,
insofar as the comparison group does not provide a good sense of what consump-
tion would have been, had there not been an intervention (Bertrand, 2002). To
check this possibility, we choose the month before and after the change in min-
imum top-up; then estimate (2) pretending that the chosen time period is the
intervention period.
The idea is to test for a zero e¤ect where it is known that the e¤ect should
be zero: nding a non-zero e¤ect in these siutations would cast doubt on how
suitable our comparison group is. Table 14 provides our estimation results.
They show no signicant change in electricity use in the month before and after
the change in minimum top-up.
Building on the logic underlying this specication check, we estimate (2)
using Treatment and Medium Top-uppers as before  with the exception
that we now look at people purchasing their top-ups predominantly o­ ine. As
can be seen in Table 17 below, we do not nd a signicant change in electricity
consumption for our pseudo Treatment Group. This addresses the possibility
that our ndings for the actual Treatment Groupare driven by a shock at the
time of the change in minimum top-up that di¤erentially a¤ected consumption
of customers purchasing small top-ups.
Variable Spec (Before) Spec (After) Spec (O­ ine)
Treatment 6.71 4.55 -1.85
(8.67) (8.10) (2.94)
Top-up amount FE -50.92*** -56.34*** -70.12***
(14.77) (14.54) (5.32)
Month FE -42.18*** -9.09 * 0.56
(5.13) (4.84) (2.58)
Table 14: Placebo Estimates.
Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
5.8 Conclusion and Next Steps
In this paper we explored the role of pre-payment in the household energy
consumption context. In the rst part, we provided background to the metering
situation in Northern Ireland. We discussed the large uptake of pre-payment
metering after the introduction of keypad meters and explored the di¤erences
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in background characteristics of households with and without a keypad meter.
In the second part of the paper, we evaluated the e¤ect of the keypad meter
on electricity consumption. We found that having a keypad meter tends to
increase (rather than decrease) electricity consumption. This is despite the fact
that the keypad provides information feedback on electricity use and comes with
higher transaction costs.
In the third part, we explored peoples top-up behaviour (looking for a cue
for our earlier nding): We noted that people tend to purchase relatively small
top-up amounts, every time they purchase top-ups and adjust to increases in
tari¤s primarily by increasing the number of top-ups (rather than average top-up
amounts).
In the nal part of the paper, we suggested that both, the positve e¤ect of
using a keypad meter on electricity use and the puzzling top-up behaviour can be
explained by the idea that people perceive costs di¤erently depending on how
aggregated they are. To test this idea, we explored the relationship between
peoples top-up behaviour and their electricity consumption. We exploited a
change in minimum top-up to get an estimate of this relationship.
In line with our hypothesis, we found that an increase in the minimum top-
up amount is associated with a decrease in electricity consumption. At least
two policy relevant questions arise from our analysis:
 Should we discourage people from using pre-payment and encourage post-
consumption payment, instead? or
 To the extent that there is a preference for pre-payment metering, should
we encourage pre-payment customers to top-up larger amounts every time
they purchase top-up?
Taking this work forward, the three main tasks will be: i) to try to get
better data on electricity consumption; ii) to model our main argument more
rigorously and iii) to test, in a large-scale eld experiment, how the relationship
between top-up behaviour and electricity consumption varies across di¤erent
parts of the population; for di¤erent changes in top-up amount; and over longer
and shorter periods of time.
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